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Introduction:

Indonesia has had a unique relationship with Islamic radicalism since the war for
Indonesian independence in 1945. While the formation of an Islamic State in Indonesia has been
at the forefront of radical movements since independence, the approaches to achieving this goal
have changed drastically over time. This goal has also had multiple adversaries, from Dutch and
Japanese colonialism, to the left-wing Sukarno regime, to the authoritarian Suharto regime, and
finally the War on Terror. Across all of these different time periods, Islamic radicals in Indonesia
have also had to contend with the different Muslim communities across the archipelago, many of
whom are not keen on the creation of an Islamic State, as well as the non-Muslim minority who
hold considerable political power despite their small numbers. The struggle for an Islamic State
is a battle fought on many fronts, most of which domestic terrorists are losing due to a bilevel
counterterrorism effort spearheaded by the Indonesian government and supported by the United
States and Australia.
Although Indonesian domestic terrorism and counterterrorism alone is a rich and well
studied field, I wanted to use my experiences at pesantrens (Islamic boardings schools) in Java to
inspire a new approach to the study of this topic. I decided I wanted to better understand the role
of pesantrens as both proponents and opponents of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. It did not
take long to recognize that for every pesantren with links to radical groups in Indonesia, there
are countless others working tirelessly to confront radicalism in the classroom, as well as having
to face growing stigma surrounding the reputation of Islamic education due to its links with
domestic terrorism.
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As a result of the link between pesantrens and radicalism in Indonesia, pesantrens have
the potential to become the strongest weapon in the Indonesian government’s arsenal for
deradicalization in the country. Unfortunately, the government approach to deradicalization has
been lackluster at best, as the American-backed War on Terror has made it easier to fight
terrorism with an enhanced military and police state rather than diffusing radicalism in the
classroom and the Mosque.
There was quite a bit of scholarship to work through as I began the process of defining
my topic for the purpose of this project. I decided that first and foremost I needed to have a
strong understanding of the historical context of Indonesian domestic terrorism, and be able to
recognize the defining moments in Indonesia’s history that lead to the creation and growth of
radical movements within the archipelago. Secondly, I needed to focus my research of
pesantrens into a few categories, which would give me a broad understanding of the topic
without being inundated with too much information. In order to do this I created research
questions that would be best answered through secondary source material research with an
enhanced historical context. My research questions became: How have pesantrens been used to
support radical movements within Indonesia? Have pesantrens often been at the forefront of
counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts, both historically and in the modern day? Finally,
how can pesantrens aid in deradicalization efforts while simultaneously countering the
stereotype that Islamic boarding schools are “hotbeds” of domestic terrorism in Indonesia?
As my research method had to be completely secondary source based due to being offsite and working from home, there is little to discuss about the changing of my approach or
revising my methods over time. However, my use of secondary sources did affect the structure of
my paper, which I will now describe. Through my research I discovered that the history of
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Islamic radicalism and domestic terrorism in Indonesia is incredibly rich and well-researched,
and abridging a description of these historical processes would lead to an ill-informed project. As
a result I had to devote quite a large number of pages to describing these historical processes in
as much detail as I could spare without burdening the paper. At the beginning of my research
process I assumed that domestic terrorism was a direct result of Dutch colonialism, which is true
to a degree, but my historical research lead me to better understand how the complex
relationships between the colonial powers, the new Indonesian state, the religious differences
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the complex ethnoreligious demographics of Indonesia
all strongly affected the formation of radical groups as well as how those groups decided to carry
out their call to jihad. This was the first section I wrote and is separated into four subsections by
time period, and the researching and completion of this portion of the paper prepared me well for
researching and better understanding the role of pesantrens within this broader historical context.
Rather than explaining every instance of pesantrens supporting radical movements in
Indonesia, I decided to focus exclusively on Pondok Ngruki, known as the “home base” of the
Ngruki Network, a syndicate that was instrumental to the growth of Jema’ah Islamiyah.
Although Pondok Ngruki carries an extremely negative reputation due to its history, I argue that
Ngruki has modernized in a way that is necessary to fight the stigma which surrounds it.
Although there has not been a formal adoption of peace education or deradicalization at Pondok
Ngruki, I argue that the atmosphere is well suited for taking the next steps in deradicalizing a
once extreme environment.
Finally, I dedicate the last sections of the paper to what, in my opinion, would be the
ideal series of steps needed in order to implement a widespread, community-backed, and
successful deradicalization program across Indonesia. These include a twofold approach upheld

Bruckner, 7

by both the Indonesian government in conjunction with smaller, grassroot organizations which
would be able to provide “boots on the ground” support to each community, starting with the
areas highlighted as “at risk” of radicalizing. Deradicalization efforts would also benefit from
being modeled off of the same structure that radical groups take, including strong and inspiring
leadership whose ideologies are both comforting and unifying. There needs to be a solid set of
new ideologies formulated by the government with the direct support of Muslim scholars that is
based on comprehensive Quranic thought, that focuses on tolerance and reconciliation. Most
importantly, peace education needs to be a mandated part of the curriculum of every school,
pesantren and secular, starting at a young age, in order to prepare young people to combat
radical ideologies as they begin to be exposed to them as they grow older. Many of these
approaches are being implemented across Indonesia, however I believe that there needs to be a
strong and well-funded government approach in order to bring the puzzle pieces together and
enact lasting change. Deradicalization will be a long and arduous process, however I believe that
Indonesia already has the groundwork laid for a strong and effective counter-approach to Islamic
extremism across the archipelago. The puzzle pieces have been flipped right-side-up, and now it
is time to put each of them together. Excellent introduction!
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A Brief Historical Overview of the Islamic Extremist Movements in
Post-WWII Indonesia

The focus of this paper is on the post WWII era, and the events that have shaped the
greater radical movement as it is seen today in Indonesia. In order to better understand the
historical context of Indonesian Islamic radicalism, the following section will provide a historical
overview of the two major radical groups in Indonesia, Darul Islam (DI) and its successor
Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), as the movements transcended the three major eras of Indonesian
politics, the era of Indonesian independence and Sukarno, Suharto, and post-Suharto eras. Each
political era had distinct interactions with both Darul Islam as well as Jema’ah Islamiyah (from
now on referenced as DI and JI), with each leader utilizing and combatting the two groups as
needed depending on potential political gain. The close relationship between the Suharto
administration and DI is especially significant as will be elaborated further on in the section.

Indonesian Independence and the Sukarno Era
It is generally agreed upon by scholars that Darul Islam was founded in 1947 by AS in West
Java. Kartosuwirjo had been very active in the movement towards an Indonesian Islamic state
since the 1920’s and was a member of the Partai Syarikat Islam (Islamic Union Party, from now
on refered as the PSI), but became a proponent of jihad between 1945 and 1949 during the
Indonesian struggle for independence from the Dutch. In Islam, jihad is defined in two ways,
first, as the internal struggle of a Muslim against one’s own sin, and secondly, as the external
struggle of all Muslims against enemies of the Islamic community and the religion at large. To
Kartosuwirjo, the enemy of Islam in Indonesia was the Japanese and Dutch occupations.
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However, once the struggle for Independence was over, Kartosuwirjo and his allies focused their
jihad on the newly founded Indonesian State.
Their discontent with the Indonesian State was twofold. The PSI and its allies had pushed
for the formation of an Islamic state with some success, by encouraging and ultimately
succeeding in having a section of the constitution require all Muslims to follow Islamic law in
what is now known as the Jakarta Charter of 1945. However, the day after the Jakarta Charter
was passed, Indonesian Christians threatened to form their own state throughout the eastern
Indonesian islands should Islamic law be written into the new constitution. Rather than risk
dividing the state at a time when the risk of another Dutch invasion was especially high, Islamic
community representatives agreed to remove the clause from the constitution. 1
Although the Indonesian State declared independence in 1945, the Dutch launched a
four-year struggle before fully acknowledging Indonesian independence in 1949. During that
time came the second affront to the Islamic movement, the Renville agreement of 1948. Ratified
by the United Nations, the Renville agreement ceded West Java to the Dutch along the “Van
Mook Line,” a line connecting the furthest advanced Dutch-held positions. It was with the
signing of the Renville Agreement that Kartosuwirjo launched his full-scale revolt against both
Dutch occupation as well as the Indonesian State:
In May 1948, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed himself the Imam (leader) of a new state, which
he called Darul Islam – which also became the name of his movement – in the first
regional rebellion to follow Indonesia’s declaration of independence. 32 He followed this
on 7 August 1949 with a proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), the Islamic State
of Indonesia, in Cisampak, West Java.2

1

Solahudin. (2013). Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia : From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, University of New
South Wales Press, 27.
2
Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 35.
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It was in effect the Renville Agreement that caused the creation of DI and kickstarted the jihad
movement in Indonesia. The Renville Agreement also represents the crux of the two Indonesian
Islamic struggles, that against Dutch colonialism as well as the formation of a modernist Islamic
State in Indonesia. The Indonesian state ceding West Java to the Dutch solidified Kartosuwirjo’s
belief in the state’s corruption and unviability, and he believed that an Islamic state was the best
way to combat these problems.
As the new leader of DI, Kartosuwirjo implemented Islamic law and military service for
boys aged sixteen to twenty-four. He divided Indonesia into three zones, Area I, Area II, and
Area III. Area I applied to anywhere in Indonesia where Islamic law was in full effect, whereas
Area II was where Islamic law was partially in control, and Area III where there was little to no
Islamic law, such as the predominantly Christian regions of Flores and West Papua. The goal of
cadres living in each area was to revolt and transform them into Area I.
Kartosuwirjo encountered difficulties in the struggle to transform Areas II and III into
Area I due to an unforeseen reason: the majority of Indonesia is already Muslim. However, this
did not imply that all Indonesian Muslims were supportive of an Islamic state or the introduction
of Sharia law. Kartosuwirjo’s draconian criminal penalties, along with the frequent raiding,
looting, and taxing of Area I and II residents were a tough sell for most Indonesians. In order to
address the reluctance of the community to follow his newly implemented criminal code:
Kartosuwirjo drew upon the idea of takfir – the declaration of a Muslim as apostate. This
takfiri stance is evident in the NII Criminal Code, where an apostate is defined as anyone
who rejects the laws of the Islamic state, even if they were born a Muslim from Muslim
parents. 36 Consciously or otherwise, Kartosuwirjo’s philosophy appears to have
reflected the war-like conditions he faced, which demanded a black and white stance so
that one could differentiate between friend and foe. 3

3

Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 37.
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The enforcement of takfir only heightened the differences between Kartosuwirjo’s followers and
the rest of the Muslim community, a distinction that can also be traced to the
traditionalist/modernist divide in Indonesia. Takfir is only one example of the radical policies
adopted by Kartosuwirjo during his quest to form his Islamic state. His policies especially
angered his longtime friend and religious teacher, Yusuf Taudjiri, who owned the Cipari Islamic
boarding school, a pesantren in West Java. It was here that Kartosuwirjo’s radicalism and
revolutionary tendencies transformed to what would now be described as terrorism, as DI
fighters attacked the boarding school forty-seven times between 1949 to 1958, with the most
serious attack killing eleven at the boarding school and ten DI insurgents. 4 These attacks are one
of the first indicators of the relationship between pesantren and radical groups, where pesantren
across Indonesia can be observed as both resisting and also supporting radical movements.
Towards the end of the Sukarno administration, the views towards DI changed
drastically. When DI first emerged, the Indonesian government had very nonchalant views
towards it, still considering DI “as the ‘bulwark of the Republic’ struggled against the ‘Pasundan
State’ sponsored by the Dutch in the West Java.” 5 As DI had been seen as a result of the people’s
struggle against Dutch incursions, the state had little desire to squash the rebellion until DI had
already grown considerably in size, following, and influence. The growth of DI was largely due
to growing disdain for the government’s acts towards specific regions, such as Sukarno’s
revoking Aceh’s status of autonomy, making it part of the province of North Sumatra. 6 By 1952,
the Nationalist Cabinet recognized DI as an enemy of the state, as DI’s policies now did not align

4

Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 38.
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6
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with the politics of the administration.7 Although DI had become newly recognized as an enemy,
it was not until 1960 that the Sukarno administration took a strong military stance against DI
incursions.
In 1959 Sukarno announced the “Guided Democracy,” signifying the official switch
towards a left-leaning authoritarian regime. Shortly after, in 1960, he commenced the “Pagar
Betis Operation,” a fairly simple military tactic of employing civilians to isolate and out DI
insurgents while simultaneously cutting supply lines. The Pagar Betis Operation was a huge
success and led to the capture and arrest of Kartosuwiryo in 1962. 8 Although DI was defeated by
militarily in 1962, a new opportunity for resurgence emerged in 1965 with the overthrow of the
Sukarno government and the establishment of the Suharto regime.

Darul Islam (DI) During the Suharto Era
The rise of Suharto is defined by the mass killings that began in an effort to “cleanse” Indonesia
of its previous administration. Suharto and his compatriots targeted members of the PKI (Partai
Komunis Indonesia) but quickly extended their reach to all “suspected” members of the party as
well as well-known humanitarian, women’s rights, and pro-democracy activists. In order to
accomplish this task, the brand new regime employed thousands of DI and ex-DI insurgents to
hunt down, arrest, and murder these new “enemies of the state.” As DI had been a staunch
opponent to the left-leaning Sukarno government, this new allyship between Suharto’s
administration and DI proved mutually beneficial. DI was able to use their newfound military
influence to target not only their political but also their religious adversaries, breathing life back

7

Arrobi, M. (2018). The Making of Islamist-inspired Terrorism and It’s Counter-terrorism in Indonesia. Politik
Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review, 3(2), 224.
8
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into a once floundering radical movement. Suharto also bestowed high ranking political,
military, and economic positions on DI cadre in order to strengthen the relationship between the
two groups. 9 The influence that these positions created only strengthened DI. Throughout the
1970’s DI members were able to organize and form cells in every major city in Indonesia.
Multiple terrorist attacks were carried out during this period, especially in Sumatra, including
bombing a Church, a Christian school, a Quran recitation event, and a series of armed robberies
in 1976. 10 However, these events eventually led to a major government pushback, where the
Suharto administration labeled DI as a network of “Komando Jihad” and conducted a long series
of raids and arrests leading up to the national election in 1977. 11 In addition, Suharto’s decision
to use DI insurgents as a counter-communism military force caused DI to lose much of its
grassroots support, as DI’s reputation changed from a locally supported Islamist movement to
merely a more extreme branch of the Suharto government.
With much of the military power stripped from DI once again, Suharto began his attack
on the political power of DI as well as other, non-violent Islamic political groups. He did this by
forcing the consolidation of all the Islamic political parties into one, the United Development
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), and enforcing rules on large gatherings and requiring
parties affirm Pancasila as their guiding principle.12 Suharto’s decision to requiring Pancasila be
the guiding political principle angered many Muslim political groups and also coincided with a
global Islamist movement in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. As Abdullah Sungkar, a
well-known DI member and founder of Pondok Ngruki, said in his defense plea, the Suharto

9

Op cit, Arrobi, M. (2018), 225.
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administration had hijacked another Muslim party, was manipulating political parties in general,
controlled parliament and manipulated elections, and turned the Indonesian flag and the
Pancasila into sacred symbols, affectively turning Indonesia into a totalitarian state, among
many other abuses of power.13 These factors, within the context of a greater, global Islamist
movement, all coincided to form Indonesia’s second major radical group, Jema’ah Islamiyah
(JI), at the turn of the 1980’s.

Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) and the Suharto Era
During the 1980’s DI was led in a new direction, namely away from “local jihadism”
with Sufi mystical underpinnings to a larger network more focused on global Islamism.14 It was
under the leadership of two Indonesian political exiles operating in Malaysia, Abdullah Sungkar
(as previously mentioned) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, that nearly 200 JI operatives traveled to
Afghanistan to receive Al-Qaeda military training. Sungkar and Baasyir had both visited the
Middle East with some frequency and met with Osama Bin Laden in order to strengthen ties in
the region.15 They also built their recruiting network largely off of the pesantren that they helped
to found, Pondok Ngruki in Solo, Central Java. During this period, the men sent to Afghanistan
were still considered a part of DI. However, after receiving religious instruction along with their
military training, the members started to abandon their old views ascribed to them by DI, and
brought these new ideas back to Indonesia. This change in doctrine is what caused the official
split from DI to (JI) Jema’ah Islamiyah, officially forming a new group in 1993. 16 From 1993 to

13
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1998 JI’s main focus was on the Indonesian government, however this changed when Osama bin
Laden released his infamous declaration for all jihadis to focus their efforts on the war against
America and its allies.17 Although there was considerable debate among JI about whether to
focus fully on this new war, it was bin Laden’s declaration that eventually led to the first Bali
bombing in 2002.

Terrorism in Post-Suharto Indonesia and the Legacy of the Bali Bombings
After 32 years as president, Suharto resigned in May of 1998. He was succeeded by
Bacharuddin Jusuf (BJ) Habibie, the third president of Indonesia. JI as an organization decided to
endorse Habibie, viewing him as a step in the right direction for the Muslim community. During
the presidential transition, JI continued to send cadres to Afghanistan for military training.
Although JI recognized the long-term process needed to turn Indonesia into the Islamic State that
they had been working towards for so many years, many of the organization’s goals were yet
unfulfilled. They began to survey buildings in Jakarta, taking note of layout, occupancy, location,
and security in order to choose the best targets. Sungkar and Baasyir met with bin Laden again in
August 1998 and sent a letter to upper-echelon members of DI and JI, urging them to take up the
war against the United States. 18 DI largely rejected the idea, and there was a split within JI
concerning whether to join or not. These debates were largely put to rest when a conflict broke
out between Muslim and Christian youth in Ketapang, leading to high tensions and violence
across the archipelago where both Muslim and Christian communities were particularly strong.19
As it became clear to the extremist groups that Muslims in Indonesia were at heightened risk

17
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from Christian violence, the debate over fighting domestic versus international enemies was put
to rest for the time being. JI began to raise funds to begin a jihad in Ambon in 1999, the largest
city in the Maluku islands, where tensions were the highest. These new funds and organization
breathed life back into a faltering JI, especially in Maluku. 20
At the height of JI’s successes in 1999, Abdullah Sungkar died. His death left a vacuum
in JI leadership, causing many leaders to break off and start their own offensives, including
scattered bombings and targeted attacks across Indonesia. These culminated on Christmas Eve,
2000 with attacks in 11 Indonesia cities targeting religious sites, killing 20 and injuring 120. The
hope was that these attacks would cause a retaliation from the targeted Christians, but this proved
not to be the case. 21 From 1999-2001 the attacks in Indonesia were focused on religious
differences, mainly towards Christians and Muslim communities considered to be opposed to an
Islamic State. However, everything changed on September 11, 2001.
Just days after the attacks on 9/11, operatives in Indonesia began planning their own
domestic attacks. The new targets were to be places occupied by foreigners, rather than sites
targeting Christian Indonesians. Many of the original plots were thwarted by a wave of arrests in
Singapore and Malaysia. However, once the operatives decided on a date, September 11, 2002,
and a location, Bali, there was no stopping them. The original date was set to commemorate the
attacks on 9/11, but they there was not enough time and pushed back the attacks. Due to the
declaration of jihad on America and its allies, they chose two popular entertainment venues
frequented by tourists, the Sari Club and Padi’s Bar, as well as the American consulate. Finally,
on the night of Saturday, October 12th 2002, bombs exploded in both venues, killing 202 people,

20
21
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mostly Australians. Less than a month later the arrests ensued, with the orchestrator of the
attacks arrested in Lamongan, East Java on November 5th. 22
The Bali Bombings of 2002 are largely considered a turning point in the Indonesian
government’s response to Islamism and domestic terrorism. As more arrests were made,
Indonesian counter terrorism forces were better equipped to disrupt the greater organizations,
causing organized large-scale attacks to grind to a halt. As Mohammad Zaki Arrobi notes, the
rise in the number of attacks in Indonesia following Bali is a mark of the decline of the
movement, not a mark of triumph. JI members acknowledged, in interviews and court
depositions, how Bali had damaged their cause. Following the Bali bombings the War on Terror
was effectively brought to Indonesia, with the United States and Australia both committing funds
and personnel to aid in the Indonesian terrorism crackdown of the early 2000’s. The string of
arrests also changed the manner of domestic terrorism in Indonesia, from organized and large
scale attacks on religious centers and sites frequented by foreigners to small, single-person
attacks focused on targeting police and military targets. These include the attack on Hamparan
Police station in 2010, the bombing of a police mosque in Cirebon in 2011, the suicide bombing
of the Solo police station in 2016, and the Sarinah-Jakarta attack, the first ISIS-claimed attack in
Southeast Asia, which targeted a police station at the beginning of 2016.23
Indonesia’s approach to counterterrorism is twofold; with a “hard” approach as well as a
“soft” approach. Unsurprisingly, the United States backed the “hard” approach, providing funds
and personnel training to for “Special Detachment 88,” (Densus 88) a counterterrorism task force
that has been under intense scrutiny in recent years for possible human rights violations,
unlawful arrests, torture, and mysterious deaths. In comparison, Australia poured money into the
22
23
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National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), a government bureau that focuses on
deradicalization and deconstructing radical ideology. BNPT hosts interfaith dialogues, cultural
exchanges, and campaigns for a more liberal version of Islam as the solution for religious
hostility in Indonesia. 24

Military Counterterrorism: The “Hard Approach”
The United States launched the War on Terror in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11. In
order to disseminate the U.S. counterterrorism approach to the rest of the world, President
George W. Bush Jr adopted what is called the “stick and carrot” approach which involves
rewarding countries that adopt U.S. policy and punishing those who do not. Rewards came in the
form of monetary, military, and humanitarian aid, while punishments were usually in the form of
trade, military, and government sanctions. 25 Indonesia’s sweeping counterterrorism law is
modeled after the U.S. Patriot Act. It is called Act No. 15 Year 2003 on the Eradication of
Terrorism Crimes, and describes the punitive action allowed by the government in the aftermath
of a terrorist attack, such as the Bali Bombings of the previous year. The law outlined in depth
the measures to be taken by the government following an attack, but it left out any detail of
measures to prevent future attacks, and does not limit the spread of radicalism across the country.
Since the law’s enactment in 2003, there has been stiff protest by Indonesians and international
Human Groups alike, most recently in 2017 when revisions were proposed to the law that would
strip Indonesians of their national citizenship for:
...traveling abroad to “join wars overseas in order to commit terrorism crimes,” and
permit criminal penalties for any “speech, though, behavior, or writings” that could lead
to “actions which adversely impact other people/communities.” The open-ended language
24
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of the proposed revisions to the counterterrorism law will facilitate violations of the
rights to free expression and nationality.” 26
Since the law’s enactment in 2003 the circle of radical Islamists in Indonesia have used human
rights as a unifying force under which to oppose the law, making the situation especially
tenuous. On the one hand, the Bali Bombings necessitated a stronger government response to
domestic terrorism in Indonesia, however the ultimately unsuccessful War on Terror and the
myriad human rights abuses which it caused have been a sticking point in successful
deradicalization efforts across the globe.
In addition to new legislative counterterrorism approaches the United States has
supported Indonesia militarily. Special Taskforce 88 is a military and police effort to put Act No.
15 into full effect, and has been funded by the US through the Ministry of External Affairs
(Menlu) of the US and under direct training of the instructors of the CIA, FBI, and the US Secret
Service. 27 Act No. 15 in conjunction with the Special Taskforce 88 have been largely successful,
responsible for the arrest of some 700 suspected extremists with 500 serving jail time. However
the vast majority of military action taken by Special Taskforce 88 have been through “shoot-tokill” fatal raids, leaving many terrorism suspects dead on site before ever being brought to
justice.

Deradicalization: The “Soft Approach”
In response to the growing backlash from Special Taskforce 88, the Indonesian
government founded the National Body of Countermeasure of Terrorism/BNPT by presidential
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decree in 2010. Ansyaad Mbai, the head of BNPT, signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with 8 Indonesian Muslim organizations who agreed to become involved in a series of
projects “to curb, prevent and counteract the development of radical Islamist ideology.” 28 New
programs have since been put in place to reach a wider audience and employ multiple
government and nongovernment organizations, as well as educational and religious groups. One
of the most promising approaches to deradicalization lies within the curriculum of the pesantren,
where some scholars are beginning to acknowledge progress being made in even the most
notorious extremist strongholds, like Pondok Ngruki in Solo. While deradicalization efforts are
still met with some pushback from the more radical fringes of Indonesian Islamic society, we are
beginning to see the groundwork being laid for a more comprehensive and sweeping approach
from the Indonesian government to smooth the swell of extremism across the archipelago. Of
course, any approach to deradicalization will require very strong financial, governmental, and
community support, but it is possible given some of the small successes that these
deradicalization organizations are beginning to achieve.
The risk of terrorist attacks in Indonesia is still very real, however the broader movement
of utilizing terrorism to forge the way towards an Islamic State in Indonesia has largely been
stopped. Fear is another factor to be contended with when carrying out counter-terrorism efforts,
as many Islamic symbols are now perceived as symbols of extremism. These include the niqab, a
traditional covering for women that covers everything except the eyes, and pesantrens, Islamic
boardings schools, have faced more backlash recently for being perceived as the “hotbed” of
domestic terrorism instruction in Indonesia. The next wave of deradicalization and
counterterrorism in Indonesia will have to rely heavily on dismantling stigma surrounding the
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many forms of Islamic expression, and to encourage cross-cultural and religious understanding
between different Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Overcoming prejudice is surely the next step
in Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts.
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Counterterrorism in Indonesia Post-Bali and the
Heightened Role of Pesantren in Deradicalization

In order to fully explore the roles pesantrens have in current counterterrorism and
deradicalization efforts, and how important these roles will be in the future, it is important to
recognize the relationships held by pesantrens both in support of and in opposition to extremism
in the past. Often the scholarship surrounding pesantrens focuses on the institutions that
“produced” known extremists, however I believe that this broad-stroke approach to the field is
counterproductive and does little in understanding the “creation” of extremists in general. To put
it in perspective, every American criminal, mass shooter, and corrupt politician came from the
American school system, yet nobody paints U.S. schools as hotbeds for criminality, despite the
United States having one of the highest incarceration rates in the entire world.

Pondok Ngruki and the Reputation Problem
Most Indonesian pesantrens associated with extremism are a part of a syndicate called
the Ngruki Network. The network is largely considered the main link between Al Qaeda and
domestic terrorism in Indonesia, and operates out of a pesantren in Solo, central Java, called
Pondok Ngruki. 29 Pondok Ngruki is arguably the most notorious radical pesantren in Indonesia,
and has been the topic of a large volume of terrorism scholarship since its founding in the
1970’s. Pondok Ngruki was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, two figures
whose history I discussed in depth in the previous chapter. Ngruki was instrumental to the
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foundation, growth, organization, and education of new members to DI and later to JI as well.
Although Sungkar has since died, Ba’asyir is still alive and walks free, having served almost two
decades in exile and another fifteen years in prison for charges related to his involvement in JI
and other terrorism-related charges. In May 2007, Farish A. Noor, a historian, scholar, and
faculty member at the Nanyang Technical University in Singapore, had just completed field
work at Pondok Ngruki and was even able to interview and photograph Ba’asyir. Noor’s paper,
Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki,
Surakarta, offers new insight into the process of progress at Ngruki, and the challenges of
studying such a polarizing topic and what many consider to be its source. He describes an
especially important field work approach: “having to constantly distinguish between the
institution (or in this case, as we shall show below, institutions) and the personalities linked to it,
who have been blown up to be larger than life.”30 I find that this distinction is vital to effective
terrorism scholarship, and have tried to keep Noor’s strategy at the forefront of my research
process.
In 1970 Sungkar was appointed as the leader of the DI branch based in Solo. Shortly after
he received the financial support to buy land in the town of Ngruki and began the construction of
the pesantren. It was here that Sungkar began lecturing on the importance of upholding Islamic
law and rejecting man-made laws, going so far as to encourage the members of the Solo mosque
to leave the 1977 presidential election ballot blank.31 It was the stronghold at Ngruki that
allowed DI to flourish in Solo and subsequently in Yogyakarta. Starting in 1987, Ngruki
students, teachers, and alumni started traveling abroad to receive military training. 32 However,
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most new recruits came from already-connected families, and recruitment was left out of the
school curriculum or official school events.
Ngruki has often been cited as instrumental not only in the early development of the
Islamist movement, but also as the educational background of multiple modern Indonesian
domestic terrorists, such as Amrozi and Ali Imron of the first Bali Bombing as well as a man
convicted of committing a police shooting, Bayu Setiono. 33 In addition, many Ngruki graduates
have later gone on to start their own pesantrens, raising concerns about the proliferation of
extremism across Java specifically and Indonesia more broadly. While there seems to be a clear
link between Pondok Ngruki, Solo, and Indonesian extremism, it is near-sighted to assume that
the region is beyond repair and incapable of entering and maintaining a period of
deradicalization successfully. This myopic scholarship can be read in articles such as The Nature
of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo, by Muhammad Wildan, a Yogyakarta-based scholar. He
writes:
Undeniably, based on the all the above many people assumed that Pondok Ngruki is the
centre for radical Islamism in sense of violence in Indonesia. Although some people are
may objected to this accusation, the facts has proved on the other way around. In
addition, the existence of several other Ngruki- like pesantrens co-founded by Ngruki
graduates in the outer regions of Solo, as Dār al-Shahadah in Boyolali and Ma’had Aly
Al-Nūr in Sukoharjo, convinced people to the accusation. Although the authorities could
not prove the involvement of Ba’asyir in the JI, the existence of JI is undeniable.
Moreover, that the region of Solo is quite central for JI underlined my suspicious that the
region is prolific of such radical Islamism.34
Many scholars like Wildan utilize an underlying tone of irreconcilability when discussing
Pondok Ngruki and the people and pesantrens that have come about because of it. The fact that
these movements have risen from the Solo area does not even necessarily conclude that everyday
Muslims living in the region are particularly committed to Islamism, much less extremism. As
33
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discussed in the previous section, although radical groups do work to recruit new members from
the regions in which they are based, it is much easier for radical groups to lose their grassroots
support, such was the case with the decline in support for DI after they became involved in the
mass killings against Suharto’s political enemies in the 1960’s. Wildan claims that weak political
influence and globalization mixing with underlying socio-cultural problems that lead to Solo
becoming an Islamist stronghold, and I believe that there is a clear method that needs to be taken
by the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration to address these issues and subsequently institute a
strong deradicalization effort in the area. What has been written can always be erased, and
addressing inequality, increasing cross-cultural and cross-religious understanding are two
important ways to start.
Noor’s paper works to lift some of the fog away from Pondok Ngruki by highlighting its
modernity despite its reputation. First and foremost, the curriculum of Pondok Ngruki has
followed the standards set by the Department of Religious Affairs since the 1980’s, meaning that
it is up to the standards of state-run and other accredited religious institutions. This means
students are enrolled in both religious and secular subjects, which are compulsory for graduation.
As Abdul Matin bin Salman writes in his paper Living Hadis of Tolerance in Multicultural
Education: A leadership Study in Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki Sukoharjo Surakarta, “this
pesantren has the same understanding with most other Muslims that various violent forms in the
name of religion is not part of Islamic teachings.” 35 However, Noor acknowledges that
“Teaching the principles of National Citizenship has always been a problem at Ngruki, given the
steadfast opposition to the state’s Pancasila ideology—implemented during the Suharto era—
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from some of the teachers of the pesantren.” 36 In addition, Ba’asyir still acts as an advisor to the
board of directors, but no longer holds any power to enact changes within the school’s structure
or curriculum. Since 1972 the Indonesian has kept a close eye on Ngruki, including video and
personal surveillance as well as going so far as to send a former graduate of Ngruki, Noor Huda
Ismail, to gain access to the institution and to closely monitor Ba’asyir and
Sungkar. 37 More than anything, it appears that in the modern day Ngruki faces a reputation
problem than an actual threat of extremism. Although it does not appear that any large-scale
deradicalization programs have yet taken place on the Ngruki campus, there are multiple similar
pesantrens across Indonesia that have implemented such measures in order to combat both
problems: extremism and stigma.

Current Deradicalization Programs Across Indonesia and Necessary Next Steps
There are many obstacles that need to be overcome for a successful deradicalization
approach to be initiated across Indonesia. One of the largest in my opinion is what Masdar Hilmy
describes as “tacit sympathy,” otherwise described as the phenomena of moderate Muslims
feeling no strong disdain or disagreement with their more radical counterparts, especially when
extremists use Muslim suffering or United States hegemony as a unifying force.38 Hilmy argues
that approaching this obstacle necessitates a twofold approach, with action from both the federal
government as well as “boots on the ground” grassroots implementation. At the government
level, moderate ideology needs to be first created and then inscribed in conjunction with
deconstructing radical ideology. I interpret these actions as using the Quran and other related
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Islamic texts that highlight the necessity of cross-religious understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance, while simultaneously rejecting any texts that either misinterpret the Quran or attempt
to substantiate areas that later become extreme, such as Ba’asyir’s belief in Islamic absolutism
that places Islam above any other religion, pitting all others against Islam as enemies to the
religion in the name of jihad. Then these new ideologies need to be disseminated across the
archipelago, through the help of well-trained and well-educated members of each Muslim
community. These members are ideally leaders in their community, ones that carry a moral and
ideological weight which is accompanied by cultural and community credibility. Hilmy asserts in
his research that ideologues, or the spearheads and disseminators of ideology, are more important
to radical movements than the ideologies themselves. I choose to corroborate this notion and thus
assert the necessity of an equally strong, widespread team of ideologues that operate within the
deradicalization camp, in essence to use the radicalism model against itself.
Deradicalization in communities must also take place in spaces that are familiar and
comforting to community members, such as mosques, the homes of community leaders, and
educational institutions, most importantly pesantrens. To that effect, peace education has proved
instrumental during these early stages of deradicalization. Addressing radicalism at a young age
proves much more effective than waiting until later stages of life to introduce new ideologies,
especially when educating already active members or aspiring recruits to extremism
organizations. Ricardo L. Garcia in his book, Teaching in Pluralistic Society, states that in order
to improve social relations and social facts that are relatively prejudicial, discriminatory and
marginalized, it is necessary to consider a way in social education and religious education that
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contains a reconciliatory, mediative, consensual, accommodative, and negotiative attitude. 39
Basing peace education in reconciliation would actively combat absolutism within Islamic
educational practices as well as encourage students to recognize absolutism when it's being
taught, and thus be able to combat it within their own educational praxis.
I believe that reconciliation can be applied specifically in Indonesia through the lens of
the Pancasila, although given the tumultuous history between radicalism and opposing the
Pancasila this may prove difficult. However, many pesantrens already attempt to uphold “the
cultural slogan of ‘Togetherness in Diversity and Indonesianness’ which involves people of
various religions... brotherhood is not confined to the five religions, but also extended to anyone
who wishes to be good and worship God sincerely and honestly and put forward the peace of
nation and state life,” which is a central tenet of the Pancasila.40 Reconciliation is described in
Pesantren and Peace Education Development: Challenges, Strategies and Contribution to
Deradicalization in Indonesia by Muhammad Thoyib as eliminating “hatred in the plurality of
people. This is in line with the view of Ursula Franklin that peace is not only a lack of war, but
also the creation of justice and the loss of fear and hatred within individuals and society.”41
There are a few challenges to enacting peace education in pesantrens across Indonesia.
For one, not all pesantrens are recognized by the Department of Religious Affairs, meaning that
their curriculum is not government recognized and there is not a true form of government
oversight concerning the school. This can be problematic for a few reasons, largely because there
is no system of checks and balances in place to ensure all the unrecognized pesantrens aren’t
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teaching radical ideology or using their platform for recruiting. In addition, with there being
approximately 40 17,000 pesantrens across Indonesia, without all of them being recognized by
the Department of Religious Affairs there’s no way the government could ensure a peace
education process was put in place in every single school, much less that it is taught by an
accredited teacher with peace education and deradicalization training. In addition, deconstructing
already-held ideology, as well as teaching new ideologies (especially told older students) can be
unconvincing and lackadaisical if carried out in the wrong way. It is essential that new ideologies
be introduced in a way that is fresh as well as familiar, using the Quran and following the
Prophet’s teachings in order to reverse radical ideology.
Peace education can easily be linked to already-existing teaching practices within
pesantrens. Namely, by teaching a broad array of Islamic and non-Islamic scholars, pesantren
“provides students with knowledge of, and appreciation for, the complexities of Islamic
thought.” 42 Woodward and Rohmaniyah argue that a well-rounded Islamic education is a
stronger barrier against radicalization than a secular education, in that people with a rich
understanding of the Quran are more likely to recognize when passages and texts are either used
incorrectly, too literally, or out of context. In addition, students who graduate from pesantrens
are able to read the Quran in its original Arabic, rather than relying on Indonesian translations
that can easily become murky depending on the goals of the translator. Woodward and
Rohmaniyah also write:
Young people who do not have solid Islamic educations can easily be misled by appeals
to seemingly clear textual references to violence. Students who have been schooled in
Qur’an and Hadith scholarship are not so easily fooled. They tend to view jihadi rhetoric
as simplistic distortions of Islamic teachings because they have the theological tools
42
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necessarily to deconstruct it. The more people know about Islam, the less likely they are
to become radicals. Pesantren are among the most important sources of this knowledge. 43
There is evidence to suggest that over recent years, more students at secular schools and
universities are turning to radicalism than those from pesantrens, linking Woodward and
Rohmaniyah’s statement. I believe that addressing radicalism at secular schools will require a
different approach than it will at pesantrens. However, I believe that peace education will be a
vital role in both instances, along with community outreach and instruction in Islam for students
who attend secular institutions. More than anything, deradicalization will require strong
government financial and ideological support. To combat resistance from radical groups, it will
be important to ensure that deradicalization focuses heavily on the inclusivity and beauty of the
Islamic faith, which must be closely tied with Quranic teachings and instruction in Islamic
thinkers from across many time periods. As the world continues down a long path of
globalization, it is crucial that Indonesia addresses radicalism swiftly, strongly, and effectively,
in order to protect and serve all Indonesians in the future.

Conclusion
It is clear that the role of pesantrens in institutionalizing deradicalization cannot be
overstated. Through my own experiences at pesantrens I can attest to the religious piety,
dedication, and humility that each student must reflect in order to do well both academically and
psychologically at a pesantren. I also believe that pursuing an Islamic education is a worthwhile
and gratifying endeavor, and that Islamic education should not be considered an enemy as
deradicalization takes a center stage in Indonesian domestic policy. While there are many more
aspects to deradicalization that I was not able to address in this paper, such as the current
43
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deradicalization procedures that take place within the walls of Indonesian prisons, secular
institutions, and community outreach, I believe that deradicalization in each setting will have
similar themes, and must be considered to be one cohesive unit with many parts, rather than a
great number of small and disconnected efforts. By putting pesantrens at the forefront of the
deradicalization effort, the government will be simultaneously working to deconstruct extremism
as well as the stigma which has engulfed Islamic educational institutions since the 1970’s, which
has only become more prevalent in the age of the War on Terror. Every successful approach to
deradicalization within a pesantren will instill more confidence in the Indonesian people in the
importance of Islamic education when combating radicalism. History has lead both Indonesians
and foreigners alike to consider pesantrens as “jihadi breeding grounds” and “hotbeds of
extremism,” so it is more important now than ever before that stigma be deconstructed at the
same time that extremism is deconstructed across Indonesia. It is absolutely crucial that a strong,
twofold approach to deradicalization, focusing on peace education be what prevents the next Bali
Bombing, rather than another military raid.
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Recommendations for Further Study

Although conducting my research in a secondary-source format was not how I envisioned
my ISP period, it was still a time of great academic and personal growth for me as a researcher
and as a student. Although there is much more to cover than what I have chosen to discuss in this
paper, I hope I was able to make it clear why my focus on pesantrens was worthwhile and
worthy of study. Naturally, my research would have been greatly improved by participant
observation and interviews, however with the time difference and language barriers, not to
mention the difficulty finding subjects to interview would be, I was forced to focus on source
material instead. Bu Ari was kind enough to send me the contact information of two subjects for
remote interviews, but I was unable to coordinate remote interviews within the timeframe and
the constraints of conducting an ISP from home. One is a contact at UNIDA Gontor by the name
of Afrih, and the other is a professor at UGM called Agus Wahyudi. Both people would be
excellent sources of information should a future student choose to study a similar topic to my
own. Additionally, I would recommend researching areas of history where deradicalization was
already attempted, as I was unable to find information on such phenomena. I hope my ISP
provided the reader with sufficient understanding of the topic and leaves areas for further study
in the future.

